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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ANSWERING BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
CLIFF PRINCE, dba PRINCE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The above-entitled action was commenced by the PlaintiffRespondent CLIFF PRINCE, hereinafter "PRINCE", doing business as
the Prince Construction Company to recover damages from the
Defendant R.
"TOLMAN".

c.

TOLMAN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., hereinafter

The action arose out of the relation between PRINCE

and TOLMAN as subcontractor and general contractor, respectively,
of the Fishlake Sanitation District Project near Richfield,
Utah.

PRINCE was awarded judgment against TOLMAN in the

approximate amount of $18,000 as damages resulting from
TOLMAN's breach of an agreement made by and between the parties
in connection with certain aspects of the construction project.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The above-entitled matter, pursuant to the stipulation
of parties at pretrial, was bifurcated for purposes of trial.
Issues relating to liability between the parties were tried
before the Court, sitting without jury, on April 27 and 28,
1977.

After hearing the evidence and argument of the parties,

the Court found in favor of PRINCE and against TOLMAN, both
as to its liability to PRINCE and on its Counterclaim.

The
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matter was subsequently set down for trial on the issue of
damages and was heard by the Court on March 24, 19 78.

Then

after, the court took the matter under advisement and on
November 30, 1978 entered written findings and conclusions
of law granting PRINCE judgment against Defendant TOLMAN in
the amount of $18,386.34.
TOLMAN also joined Western Surety Company, Inc., th;
surety for PRINCE on the project, on its Counterclaim.

Wes:

surety cross-claimed against PRINCE and joined Genevieve A.
Prince as general indemni tor
Surety.

under the bond issued by West.

The trial court, finding that there were no breache

by Respondent PRINCE, dismissed TOLMAN' s Counterclaim against
PRINCE and Western Surety.

Appellant TOLMAN is not appeali:

the findings of the trial court relating to the dismissal o'
its Counterclaim and consequently Wes tern Surety and Genevi1
Prince are not Respondents to this appeal and are not befor:
this Court.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL BY TOLMAN
The Appellant TOLMAN seeks a reversal of the

jud~e

entered against i t in the sum of $18,386.34 or, in the
alternative, seeks a remand of the matter back to the trial
court for recomputation of the damages awarded to PRINCE.

-2-
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
(Preliminary Statement)
The Statement of Facts set out in Appellant's Brief
.n

is prefaced by Appellant's statement that "the facts of the
case are basically set forth in the findings of fact and

:h:
!S'.

conclusions of law entered by the trial court".

The Appellant

nevertheless. without challenging the findings of fact made
by the trial court, sets out a version of facts which misstates the evidence and findings made by the Court and which
contain matters entirely irrelevant to issues presented by
this appeal.

As a result, Respondent PRINCE is constrained

IS:

to set out with care a statement of the relevant and material
.i:

facts as found by the trial court below.
o:

The issues tried before the trial court fell into

1i1

1~

two categories: PRINCE'S claim for damages under an oral
agreement between PRINCE and TOLMAN; and TOLMAN's Counterclaim
which was eventually dismissed after trial.

The award of

damages to PRINCE was based upon an oral agreement reached
between PRINCE and TOLMAN relating to three i terns under the
subcontract between PRINCE and TOLMAN.

The Court found the

existence of the oral agreement and also that TOLMAN was
estopped to deny the agreement and its enforcement.
It does not clearly appear whether TOLMAN
appeals the findings of the trial court relating to the

-3Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

making of the agreement and the liability issues found in

1/

favor of PRINCE and against TOL~.AN.- TOLMAN also does not
appeal the dismissal of its Counterclaim as against PRINCE
and Western Surety.
The following statement of facts sets out the general
background relating to the contract between PRINCE and TOLMAl
and those facts which related to the award of damages in
favor of PRINCE.
(Fishlake Project and Subcontract)
on September 25, 1972, TOLMAN was awarded a contract
by the United States Departl':lent of Agriculture Forest Servici
hereinafter "Forest Service", to perform work in connection
with the construction of a sewage transmission line with
attendant lift stations, vaults and service road at Fishlake
in Sevier County, State of Utah.

The myriad items under the

!/

Throughout its brief and particularly on page 6, TOLMAN
makes reference to oral statements made from the bench by
the trial court,evidently treating the statements as the
court's findings.
The court did make statements rel a ting to
its findings from the bench. However, after further argumen1
and the submission of proposed findings of fact from all
parties, the court entered formal written findings of fact
on November 30, 1978 (R.150-154).
The written findings
entered by the trial court supersede any oral statements mad1
by the court a ~ reliance, if any, by TOLMAN on those state·
ments is misplaced. See Newton v. State Road comrn'n, 23
Ut.2d 350, 463 P.2d 565 (1970); In Re Astill's Estate, 14
Ut.2d 217, 381 P.2d 95 (1963); Park v. Jameson, 12 Ut.2d W
364 P.2d 1 (1961); In Re Roth's Estate, 2 Ut.2d 40, 269 P.2d
278 (1954); Mccollum v. Clothier, 241 P.2d 468 (1952).
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prime contract were either lump sum or, in most cases, unit
price items.

The total contract price subject to unit price

quantity changes was set at $630,585.

At the end of the

contract, however, due to change orders and quantity changes,
al

TOLMAN actually received in excess of $1 million under the
contract with the Forest Service.
On October 7, 1972 PRINCE and TOLMAN entered into a

• 2/

subcontract agreement.- Under the terms of the subcontract,
PRINCE agreed to perform eleven items under the prime contract
between TOLMAN and the Forest Service.

i terns referred to the prime contract by ·mi t number and the
Forest Service specifications were incorporated by reference
into the subcontract between PRINCE and TOLMAN.

The subcontract

bebveen PRINCE and TOLMAN utilized the unit prices contained in
the prime contract and set out estimated quantities for each
of the eleven items.

The items contained in the subcontract

between PRINCE and TOLMAN are set out here for the convenience
of the Court:

:o

DI

Each of the eleven

APPROXIMATE

ITEMS WITH UNIT
PRICES WRITTEN
IN WORDS

UNIT
PRICE

APPROXIMATE
AMOUNT

QUANTITY

UNIT

42,000 C.Y.

2221-1

Excavate and Waste
(Lagoons)

.80

33,600.00

17,500 C.Y.

2221-2

Embankment (Lagoons)

.30

5,250.00

J,

d
~/

Trial Ex. Plaintiff's "A", R.l.
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APPROXIMATE
QUANTITY

UNIT

ITEMS WITH UNIT
PRICES WRITTEN
IN WORDS

UNIT
PRICE

1,500 Cu.Y.

2805-1

Topsoil Furnished
(Lagoons)

125 M.G.

2231-1

80 Hours
3 Each

APP RO!

~

1. 30

1,9~

Watering (Road,
Lagoons, Misc.)

60.00

7 .s~

2232-1

Rolling (Road,
Lagoons, Misc.)

20.00

1,6~

2718-1

Intercepting Dip

25,00

1,650 C.Y.

2220-1

Roadway Excavation
(Road)

2,588 C.Y.

2222-1

Borrow (Road)

]_/
.90

25,880 Sta.Y.

2230-1

Overhaul (Road)

.60

15,51i

15,100 Yd.Mi.

2230-2

Overhaul (Road)

1.00

1s,rn

700 C.Y.

2240-1

Crushed Aggregate
Grading C (Road)

5.00

3,5«

,,
8'·

.so

87,ll'

Less 10% to R.

c.

Tolman

The total subcontract price subject to adjustment
based upon changed quantities was the sum of $87,257.20 l•

10% of that amount which was to be paid to TOLMAN as the
general contractor.

3/ The .90 figure for item 2222-1 was a typographical er&
and was recognized by the parties as actually $4. 00 per yd.
Tr. 137.
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In October of 1972, PRINCE commenced work under the
subcontract.

PRINCE and his crew worked through the fall of

1972, stopping and commencing work as the weather permitted
in accordance with Forest Service work stoppage and start-up
orders of general applicability to the job site.

By August

of 1973, PRINCE had made substantial progress toward the
completion of most items under the subcontract.
(Oral Agreement Between PRINCE and TOLMAN)
The basis of the proceedings below related to three
items under the subcontract between PRINCE and TOLMAN; item
nos. 2222-1, 2230-1 and 2230-2.

The above three items are

related, that is, they are performed by the contractor
through the same operation,

Item 2222-1 involves the excava-

tion of the earth and items 2230-1 and 2230-2 involve the
method of computation of payment for the distances over which
the earth must be hauled.

The three iter

J

are highly profitable

and are sometimes referred to as "loaded items".
Throughout the early summer of 1973, PRINCE was delayed
in performing the three items by virtue of the fact there was
an open trench adjacent to the road along which the earth was
to be hauled.

TOLMAN had informed PRINCE that the hauls and

borrow could not be completed until the trench was filled.
By August of 1973 work under the three items was ripe for
commencement,

In order to perform the work, it was necessary

for PRINCE to make arrangements for trucks, related equipment
and operators.

-7-
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At that time, PRINCE did not have sufficient equipme:
on the job site in order to commence the overhaul under thosi
items.

Knowing that, PRINCE contacted Don Wirthlin, a liceru

engineering contractor.

Wirthlin agreed to supply dump truci

to PRINCE and operators in order to complete the haul.

The

haul involved the moving of approximately 2, 500 cubic yards

1

earth from a point specified by the Forest Service along a
road and dropping the earth at various intervals.
supplying of the trucks and operators,

~'lirthlin

For the

agreed with

PRINCE that he would charge a flat sum of $3.00 per cubic
yard of earth moved without regard to station or mile yards.

4/
The cost approximated $7, 500. - Under that arrangement, PRINC
stood to profit by approximately $ 30, 000 on the three i terns.
In mid-August of 1973, PRINCE together with Ward
Ragner, an employee, met with R.

c.

Tolman, the President of

the Tolman Construction Company, at the job site at Fishlake
PRINCE informed TOLMAN that he was ready to commence work
on the three i terns.

PRINCE explained to TOLMAN that he had

made arrangements for trucks and operators through Don Wirth:
TOLMAN then asked PRINCE what Wirthlin was charging for the
use of the trucks and operators.

PRINCE responded that

Wirthlin was charging the sum of $3.00 per cubic yard.
TOLMAN then told PRINCE that he could perform the work

!/

Trial Transcript 97-102.

-8-
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cheaper since he had idle trucks and operators which could be
utilized in order to make the haul and that TOLMAN would
charge PRINCE only $3.00 per cubic yard, the price to which
Wirthlin had agreed.

It was agreed by the parties that TOLMAN,

utilizing his trucks and operators, would proceed to make the
haul and that the cost of $3.00 per cubic yard would be charged
5/
against the swn due PRINCE under the contract.Immediately subsequent to that conversation with
TOLMAN, PRINCE contacted Don Wirthlin and told him that it
would be unnecessary for him to perform the work they had
discussed relating to the three items.

PRINCE then set out

to perform other items under the contract,and,on the basis of
his agreement with TOLMAN,PRINCE fully expected that the work
would be performed by TOLMAN and that $3.00 per cubic yard
would be charged against those items and PRINCE would receive
the difference between the contract price and the $3.00 per
cubic yard which was to be charged by TOLMAN.

In September

of 1973, TOLMAN performed the overhaul on the three items
utilizing his idle trucks and machinery.
TOLMAN subsequently submitted requests for payment
under those items to the Forest Service and was paid an
aggregate amount of $52,000, a sum which exceeded the original

21

R.30-31· Trial Court's Findings of Fact, Paragraphs 6-7.
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contract price due to changed quantities.

PRINCE made claim

against TOLMAN for payment under the subcontract as modified
by their oral agreement.

TOLMAN, however, refused to pay

PRINCE, claiming that PRINCE had not performed the i terns and
therefore was not entitled to payment.
At trial, TOLMAN denied that he had made the oral
agreement with PRINCE relating to the three items on the
job site in August of 1973.

The trial court specifically

found, based upon the testimony of witnesses and the
circumstances surrounding the agreement, that TOLMAN did,
in fact, make such an agreement and that, additionally, he

y

was estopped to deny the existence of the agreement.

Based

upon those findings, which are not appealed by TOLMAN, the
Court found that PRINCE was entitled to damages against
TOLMAN for TOLMAN's breach of the contract based upon the
difference between the subcontract price and TOLMAN' s actual
cost in performing the three items.

~/

During the course of trial, Respondent PRINCE elicited
testimony from TOLMAN that TOLMAN had in his original bid to
the Forest Service utilized profit margins in i terns 2222-1,
2230-1 and 2230-2 to offset costs of another item.
(Tr. W
187) • Respondent PRINCE argued to the trial court that tow•
the end of the project TOLMAN recognized the re la ti on betwe~
the three items and the subsidized item and was thus motivab
to w~thhold payment to PRINCE.
The trial court, however,
declined to make a finding of bad faith on TOLMAN's part.
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(Damages)
The findings entered by the trial court below set
out with detail the specific elements used by the trial court
in its award of damages to Respondent PRINCE.

The findings

entered by the trial court are not disputed by TOLMAN.
ARGUMENT
(Preliminary Statement)
The legal arguments set out in the three points of
TOLMAN's brief are based upon erroneous factual premises.
Each point assumes the validity of TOLMAN's factual claims
at trial manifestly ignoring the findings of fact made and
entered by the trial court.
It is difficult for Respondent PRINCE to know, based
upon the Brief of Appellant TOLMAN, the issues from which
TOLMAN appeals.

TOLMAN concec

in his Brief that the facts

are as found by the trial court and entered in the trial
court's findings.

Appellant TOLMAN claims that he appeals

only the application of quantum meruit to the case and
evidently disputes the measure of damages applied by the
trial court.

Despite those statements, TOLMAN sets out facts

and arguments which have little or nothing to do with the
theory of liability or the measure of damages applied by the
trial court.

In order to put the case in perspective and to

align the issues it is necessary for Respondent PRINCE to
set out the basic theory of liability upon which the Court
awarrle>d judqincnt in favor of PRINCE.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND AN ORAL
AGREEMENT BETWEEN PRINCE AND TOLMAN
(Oral Agreement Between PRINCE and TOLMAN)
Prior to August of 1973, the written subcontract
between PRINCE and TOLMAN provided that PRINCE would perforl'
the work under items 2222-1, 2230-1 and 2230-2.

Those three

items were critical to PRINCE since, as he testified at tria:

7/
they were "loaded i tems"-bearing significant profit which
offset losses on other contract items.

PRINCE had experiem

some delay caused by TOLMAN in performing the three items.
Believing that t.'1e equipment he had on the job site would be
occupied in the lagoon area, PRINCE made the arrangement wit
Don Wirthlin to supply the trucks and operators necessary tc
make the haul under the three items.

PRINCE went to TOLMAN

and explained his arrangements with Wirthlin to make the hai
TOLMAN agreed at that time that he would make the haul ata
price equal to or less than that of l'lirthlin.
At that time, PRINCE and TOLMAN entered into an oral
agreement which modified the written subcontract.

TOLMAN

agreed to perform the work under those i terns and in so doinc
stepped into the shoes of Wirthlin, with respect to his
relationship with PRINCE.

Effectively, TOLMAN became PRINCE

subcontractor.

J./

R.225-227.

-12-
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At the time of trial, Defendant TOLMAN suggested that
the oral agreement, if made, was barred by the provisions of
paragraph 10 of the subcontract which stated that the terms
of the subcontract could only be changed or modified by a
written agreement and that written consent to assign or
further subcontract was required under paragraph 6 of the
subcontract.

This Court, however, in a number of decisions

has held that parties to a written contract may orally change
or modify the terms of the written contract.

_y

As this Court

stated in Davis v. Payne and Day, Inc., 10 Ut.2d 53, 348 P.2d
337, 339 (1960):
It is a well-established rule of
law that parties to a written contract
may modify, waive, or make new terms
notwithstanding terms in the contract
designed to hamper such freedom.
Favorably citing Davis v. Payne and Day, Inc., this Court in
PLC Landscape Const. v. Piccadilly Fish 'N Chips, Inc., 502
P.2d 562 (1972) stated:
. there is nothing so sacrosanct
about having entered into one agreement
that it will prevent the parties entering into any such change, modification,

8/ Wilson v. Gardner, 10 Ut,2d 89, 348 P.2d 931 (1960);
Salzner v. Jos. J. Snell Estate Corp., 81 Ut. 111, 16 P.2d
923 (1973). See also, Kenison v. Baldwin, 351 P.2d 307
(Okla. 1960); Canada v. Allstate Insurance Company, 411 F.2d
517 (5th Cir. 1969).
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extension or addition to their arrangement for doing business with each other
that they may mutually agree.
PLC at 563.
The court below found that PRINCE and TOLMAN entered
into an oral agreement which modified the subcontract agreeD
TOLMAN was to perform the work under items 2222-1, 2230-1 ar,
2230-2 and charge $3.00 per cubic yard against the price due
PRINCE under the contract.

PRINCE performed under the sub-

contract and was entitled to receive its benefits.

TOLMAN,

as prime contractor, collected the sums due under the three
items but refused to disburse to PRINCE in accordance with
the subcontract thereby breachingthe agreement.
(Promissory Estoppel)
The trial court also made findings and entered cone!:
sions of law bearing on the issue of promissory estoppel.
While the court found that an agreement had been reached
between PRINCE and TOLMAN relating to the three items, the
court also found that the strict elements of a contract need
not be met in order to entitle PRINCE to judgment.
The court found that TOLMAN promised PRINCE that he
would perform the work under the three i terns at a cost equal
to that of the Wirthlin bid.

That promise was made by TOLMN

with the reasonable expectation that PRINCE would forbear.
In justifiable reliance on TOLtlAN' s promise, PRINCE did forbear, rot only by terminating the arrangements with \virthlin bu'.
by taking no action himself.

After making the promise, TOL~

-14-
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performed the work under the items, collected payment as the
general contractor from the Forest Service and refused to pay
PRINCE under the agreements.
The trial court held that TOLMAN was estopped to deny
the existence and enforceability of the oral agreement with
PRINCE and his relationship as PRINCE's subcontractor.

In

so holding, the court relied upon a number of decisions in

9/
this court applying the doctrine of promissory estoppel.The basis of the application of the doctrine is set out in
Section 90 of the American Law Institute's Restatement of
10/
Contracts which has been cited with approval by this court.
Section 90 of the Restatement provides as follows:
PROMISE REASONABLY INDUCING
DEFINITE AND SUBSTANTIAL
ACTION.
A promise which the promiser should
reasonably expect to induce action or
forbearance of a definite and substantial
character on the part of the promisee and
which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be
avoided only by enforcement of the promise.
The trial court found in favor of PRINCE on each of
the elements necessary under Restatement 90 to assert promissory estoppel.

TOLMAN made a promise reasonably expecting to

induce forbearance of a substantial character; PRINCE reasonably

9/ J. P. Koch Inc. v. J. C. Penney Co., Inc., 534 P.2d 903
(l975): Baggs v. Anderson, 528 P.2d 141 (1974); Kelly v.
Richards, 83 P.2d 731 (1938).
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relied, forbearing on the performance to his detriment; and
avoid injustice the court enforced TOLMAN's promise.

Articulating the principle contained in Restatement
this court in J.P. Koch Inc. v. J. C. Penney Co.,
fn. 9,

Inc.,~

stated~

The invocation of estoppel does not
necessarily involve any contract or
agreement between the parties, consequently, the elements of a contract are
not involved and there is no requirement
of consideration.
It is a doctrine of
equity to prevent one party from deluding
or inducing another into a position where
he will unjustly suffer loss. As applicable here, the test is whether there is
conduct, by act or omission, by which one
party knowingly leads another party,
reasonably acting thereon, to take some
course of action, which will result in
his detriment or damage if the first party
is permitted to repudiate or deny his
conduct or representation.
This Court's analysis in Koch that the doctrine of
promissory estoppel can be invoked without regard to the
limitations imposed by traditional contract law has also be
followed in other

11/

jurisdictions.~

Thus, the trial court made a two-prong finding.

It

found, first, that a contract did exist between PRINCE and
TOLMAN under which TOLMAN was to perform the haul as PRINC!
subcontractor, and, secondly, that in a.ny case, TOLMAN,by

11/ See, Janke Const. Co., Inc. v. Vulcan, 527 F.2d 772 (:
Cir. 1976); Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores Inc., 133 N.lv.2d 267
(Wis. 1965),
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virtue of his conduct,was estopped to deny the existence of
the agreement with PRINCE and that it was not in writing in
compliance with paragraphs 2 and 6 of the subcontract
agreement.

The trial court, having found that TOLMAN was

liable to PRINCE under the oral agreement, then considered
the award due PRINCE by virtue of TOLMAN's breach.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT PRINCE
Points II and III of TOLMAN's Brief appear to address
the issue of the measure of damages utilized by the trial
court in awarding judgment to PRINCE.

Since the two points

are so substantially related and since they both are based
upon the same erroneous premise, Respondent PRINCE will treat
both points concurrently.
(Computation of Damages by Trial Court)
The trial court, having once found that TOLMAN breached
the oral agreement with PRINCE, awarded judgment to PRINCE in
the sum of $24,316.33, less certain offsets, which reduced the
judgment to approximately $18,000.

At trial, Respondent PRINCE

urged that the measure of damages should be as stated by the
12/
court in I<eller v. Deseret Mortuary Cornpany"that the nonbreaching party should receive an award which will put him in

QI

23 Ut.2d 1, 455 P.2d 197, 198 (1969).

-17Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

as good a position as he would have been in had there been L
breach".

That is, Respondent urged the trial court to awari

the contract price to PRINCE less the $ 3. 00 per cubic yard
13/
agreed to by TOLMAN.~The trial court, however, declined to
hold TOLMAN to the $3.00 per cubic yard price.

Rather, tie

trial court awarded PRINCE the subcontract price on the tire
items less TOLMAN•s actual cost of performance of those ite:
Additionally, the trial court refused to award PRIN[
increases in those quantities above the original estimates,
Thus, the trial court found that the contract price to whict
PRINCE was entitled was the sum of $39,586, the aggregateo:
items 2222-1, 2230-1 and 2230-2.

The court then subtracted

from that figure the sum of $15, 269 which TOLMAN testified 1
his actual cost in performing the three i terns.
yielded the sum of $24, 316. 33.

The rernainde

Consistent with the subconh

agreement, the court reduced the $24,316.33 by 10%, the
general contractor's share.

The court also allowed offsets

in favor of TOLMAN, on other items, the total of which,
including the 10% reduction, equalled $5,929.99.

That figu:

when subtracted from the $24,316.33 resulted in the final
judgment of $18,386.34 awarded to PRINCE.

13/ Additionally, PRINCE proffered testimony, which was
excluded by the trial court, demonstrating consequential
damages in view of the breach by TOLMAN.
The court found
those damages to be unforeseeable by the parties.

-18-
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(Measure of Damages)
The trial court applied the generally accepted measure
of damages in a contract case.

That is, it awarded to PRINCE

the sum to which he was entitled -- the contract price.
Indeed, for purposes of the relations of the parties, PRINCE's
contract was performed and he was entitled to the contract
price.

Section 346(2) of the Restatement of Contracts states

that rule:
(2) For a breach by one who has
promised to pay for construction, if it
is a partial breach the builder can get
judgment for the instalment due, with
interest; and if it is a total breach he
can get judgment, with interest so far
as permitted by the rules stated in
§337, for either
(a) the entire contract price and
compensation for unavoidable
special harm that the defendant
had reason to foresee when the
contract was made, less instalments already paid and the cost
of completion that the builder
can reasonably save by not
completing the work; or

*

*

*

This Court reiterated that rule in Holman v. Sorenson,
556 P.2d 499

(1976):
It is the undisputed law of this
state and the general consensus of legal
writers that breach of a construction
contract damages are based upon the
total amount promised for the project,
less the reasonable cost of completing
it.
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While TOLMAN had promised to complete the three itei

for $3.00 per cubic yard, he claimed his actual cost to bet
times that figure.

TOLMAN has complained that the trial co,

utilized quantum meruit improperly.

However, any error in

that regard inured to the benefit of TOLMAN.

That is, the

trial court allowed TOLMAN's actual cost to be offset again:
the contract price, rather than holding him to his agreement
at $3.00 per cubic yard.

The trial court's references to

quantum meruit were strictly in an attempt to allow TOLMAN
his actual costs.
(Appellant TOLMAN Urges the
Application of an Inapposite Rule)
TOLMAN's entire argument with respect to the assessi
of damages is based on an erroneous factual predicate.
contrary to the findings entered by the trial court,

TOil

assM~

that TOLMAN, under paragraph 2 of the subcontract, took over
the three i terns because of the default of PRINCE.

The entir

argument advanced in the brief flows from that proposition.
The cases cited by Appellant have application to that
circumstance.

Had the trial court so found, the cases cite'

by TOLMAN would have color able pertinence.

They are, howeve

irrelevant.
The trial court found that PRINCE performed undertl
subcontract through TOLMAN as his subcontractor under an or'
agreement.

It appears that the gravamen of Appellant's
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; complaint is that PRINCE should not have received the award
t

because he did not perform the work under the three items.
That proposition, however, ignores the promises and agreement
of TOLMAN and the damages which resulted to PRINCE occasioned
by TOLMAN's own conduct,

Appellant cannot be heard to complain

about the court's utilization of quantum meruit which clearly
benefited TOLMAN.
CONCLUSION
The issues and arguments advanced by the Appellant
substantially deviate from the issues tried and resolved by
the trial court.

As a result, meaningful response to those

arguments is substantially impeded.

Nevertheless, Respondent

has set out the theory and basis of the trial court's ruling
and its award of damages, both of which are supported by
the record.

TOLMAN entered into an oral agreement with PRINCE

to which he must and should be held.

The trial court so found

and should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

MIC~Y~)

of and
WATKISS &
310 South
Salt Lake

for
·/
CAMPBELL
Main Street, 12th Floor
City, Utah 84101

Attorneys for Respondent
CLIFF PRINCE, dba PRINCE
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY
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